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THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION
Victor E. Schwartz*

INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute, a group of the United States's most
prestigious judges, law professors, and attorneys, was founded in 1923
to bring coherence, reason, and consistency to state judge-made law.
One of the projects the ALI undertakes periodically as part of this mission is to "restate" areas of the common law. The ALI reviews the case
law and distills it into a series of "black letter" rules, followed by ex-

planatory "Comments," which are, in turn, followed by "Reporters'
Notes," which show the case law basis for the rule itself. Although ALI
Restatements have no force of law on their own, they have had a persuasive impact on the courts.
I. THE RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
One of the ALI's first projects was to restate the law of torts.' The
Reporter for the Restatement (First) of Torts, Francis H. Bohlen, was
* Victor E. Schwartz is a senior partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring LLP in
Washington, D.C. Mr. Schwartz is co-author of the most widely used torts casebook in the United
States, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Materials on Torts, and author of Comparative

Negligence. He drafted the Model Uniform Product Liability Act and recently served on the Advisory Committee of The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
project. Mr. Schwartz obtained his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston University in 1962 and his
J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University in 1965. He wishes to thank his colleagues, Mr.
Mark Behrens and Mr. Barry Parsons at Crowell & Moring for their constructive criticisms and
assistance in the preparation of the Article. The views expressed, for better or for worse, remain
those of the Author based on his personal experience with the Restatement (Third) project and the
law of torts.
I. See RESTATENMNT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1934).
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the most famous torts professor in America and the author of the leading torts text of the time. Professor Bohlen was assisted by a distinguished advisory committee, including Judge Herbert F. Goodrich, Professor Warren A. Seavey, and practitioner Laurence H. Eldredge. The
project was a "premier" event for the ALI and was prepared from 1923
until 1939. The diverse views of different state courts were slowly and
carefully evaluated. In general, when the Restatement (First) of Torts
derived a rule, the majority rule was chosen.
Many state courts in the United States turned to the Restatement
(First) of Torts as a source of law,2 which often had a more powerful
impact on a particular state than decisions of sister states.
II. FROM THE RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS TO THE
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS

A.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts "Team"

From 1939 until 1950, the law of torts, as is always the case, went
through substantial changes. New areas of tort law emerged, such as
claims for wrongful injury prior to birth.3 In 1953, the ALI leadership
made a decision to restate the law of torts again. To lead this effort, the
ALI leadership called upon a renowned professor and author of the
leading torts text at that time, William L. Prosser, then Dean of the University of California Law School at Berkeley. Beginning in 1954, Dean
Prosser served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4 Dean
Prosser passed away in 1971, four years short of the final completion of
the work in 1975. The project was brought to a successful conclusion by
Dean John Wade of the Vanderbilt University Law School, a dear
friend, a person with great insight and an encyclopedic knowledge of
tort law, and co-author of our torts case book.'
2. See, e.g., Mills v. Charles Roberts Air Conditioning Appliances, 379 P.2d 455, 457
(Ariz. 1963) (en banc) (relying on the risk-utility test set forth in the Restatement (First) of Torts);
Crane v. Smith, 144 P.2d 356, 361 (Cal. 1943) (holding that a possessor of land is under a duty to
exercise ordinary care to make a condition reasonably safe for business visitors); Ellithorpe v. Ford
Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tenn. 1973) (relying on the Restatement (First) of Torts to determine whether contributory negligence is a viable defense for non-negligence-based conduct).
3. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding that a child injured
during birth had standing to bring an action for medical malpractice); Verkennes v. Comiea, 38
N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (holding that a cause of action existed for the wrongful death of an unborn child); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949) (holding that a
child injured during pregnancy had a cause of action if the child was viable at the time of injury).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS (1965).
5. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCIWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS
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Deans Prosser and Wade were aided by an advisory committee
composed of distinguished judges, law professors, and practitioners.6
B. The Development of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
In formulating the new Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Reporters and the Advisers not only sought to reflect social changes that had
occurred in the law of torts since the 1930s, but to detect errors that
were made and clarify matters that might have been unclear in the Restatement (First) of Torts. They also responded to criticisms expressed
in legal literature and in the case law that had been made about the Re-

statement (First) of Torts.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts was also expanded in scope.
The commentary more fully expounded upon the reason behind each
"black letter rule," and the reporters' notes were more abundant.
Most importantly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts differed from
the Restatement (First) of Torts in that its content was shaped more by
the Reporters' and advisory committee's evaluation of the wisdom of
competing case law than a presumption to follow "clear majority" rules.
The so-called "minority rule" frequently made its way into the "black
letter."'
IH. THE BEST KNOWN PART OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS: SECTION 402A
No portion of the new Restatement (Second) of Torts was more
reflective of the change in style, content, and format from the Restate-

ON TORTS (9th ed. 1994).
6. The academic members were: Fleming James, Jr. of Yale, Robert E. Keeton of Harvard,
W. Page Keeton of Texas, Wex Smathers Malone of Louisiana State, Clarence Morris of the University of Pennsylvania, Warren A. Seavey of Harvard, Samuel D. Thurman, Jr. of Utah, John W.
Wade of Vanderbilt, and as of 1962, Allan H. McCoid of Minnesota. The judicial members were
Gerald F. Flood, Superior Court of Pennsylvania; Calvert Magruder, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; and Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California.
The practicing lawyers were Laurence H. Eldredge of Philadelphia and two Advisers to the
Council, Francis M. Bird of Atlanta and Charles H. Willard of New York City. See Herbert
Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS at viii (1965).
7. See id.at ix.
8. See RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 cmt. a (1965) (noting that the rule of section 357, holding a lessor liable for an injury to a lessee due to a condition of disrepair, was a minority rule); id.§ 674 reporter's note (noting that the rule of section 674, imposing liability on a
party that initiates wrongful civil proceedings, was a minority rule when the Restatement was
published); id. § 693 reporter's note (noting that the rule of section 693 regarding indirect interference on marital relations was a minority rule when the Restatement was published).
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ment (First) of Torts than section 402A, which ushered in so-called
"strict liability" for products.9
The development of section 402A, the best known section of the
entire Restatement (Second) of Torts, planted the seeds for both the
need for and content of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The key language of section 402A stated:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property.... [This rule] applies although ... the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.10
Section 402A was drafted three different times. When the first
draft appeared in 1961, it was applicable only to food and drink." The
second draft, in 1962, extended 402A to include products for "intimate
bodily use."' 2
As of 1962, no further modifications could be made because a fundamental principle behind "Restatements" is that they must restate existing case law. The Reporters and the advisory committee are not
permitted to write their own "tort code," no matter how persuasive or
"right thinking" their views." At least a scintilla of existing case law
must be the source of each black letter rule.4
Regardless, the Reporters and the advisory committee wanted to
extend strict liability in tort to all products, but they had no case law to
support them in 1962. Lo and behold, in 1963, one of the Advisers, the
Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, Roger
Traynor, wrote Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 5 Greenman
was a case that involved a power tool that could be used as a saw, drill,
and wood lathe. The plaintiff was using the tool as a lathe when the
piece of wood being turned suddenly flew out of the machine, struck
him on the forehead, and inflicted serious injuries. 6 Expert witnesses
testified that inadequate set screws were used to hold the machine to9. See id.§ 402A.
10. Id. § 402A(I), (2)(a).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962).
13. The ALI does conduct other projects, such as the Model Penal Code, where full latitude
to "create" law is available.
14. The ALI's purpose is "educational" and includes "promot[ing] the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs." The Am.Law Inst., Bylaw
§ 1.01, reprintedin 74 A.L.I. PROc. 521 (1997).
15. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (in bank).
16. See id at 898.
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gether, so that normal vibration could cause the lathe to move away
from the piece of wood being turned and "let go" of it.17 Justice Traynor
declared that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be8

ing.

,,1

Although some courts had allowed products liability cases to proceed under theories other than negligence, they were basically "contract
extension" cases, using implied warranty theories under contract law to
"run" beyond the immediate buyer of a product to the person injured by
the product. 9 What Justice Traynor did that was new and significant in
Greenman was to scrap the fiction about implied warranties "running"
beyond contracting parties. He anchored his decision in tort law and his
views of the public policy that should guide tort law. His principal rationale was that "[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather20 than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."
Justice Traynor did not define when a product would be deemed to
be "defective," and he did not make any distinctions among what is now
commonly known and will be discussed here as defects in manufacture,
defects in design, and defects based on failure to adequately warn. Specifically, the opinion made no distinction between whether the so-called
"inadequate set screws" were in accord with the manufacturer's intended design (a design case) or not in accord and an example of failure
in quality control (manufacturing defect).2 Justice Traynor provided one
rule, indivisible, for all products that he believed would provide justice
for all. As a result, in 1963, the Reporter, William Prosser, and his advisory committee, including Justice Traynor, now had "the case" to apply
section 402A to all products. They did.
When the black letter rule was "restated," however, it did not use
the exact language Justice Traynor had used in Greenman, which relied

17. See id at 899.
18. Id.at 900.
19. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 1961) (holding
that an implied warranty of fitness exists for automobile manufacturers), Wojciuk v. United States
Rubber Co., 108 N.W.2d 149, 185 (Wis. 1961) (holding that privity of contract is not necessary
for a plaintiff to bring suit against a tire company for injuries caused by a car tire blow out).
20. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
21. See id. at 899 (discussing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness).
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on the two words: "defective products."2 The words "unreasonably
dangerous" were added to the black letter formula.' These words, as
well as the word "defect," became the subject of much litigation over
the next thirty years.
IV.

SECTION 402A's USE OF "UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS"-

WHAT DID IT MEAN?
The insertion, purpose, and meaning of the words "unreasonably
dangerous" into the Greenman defect formula were explained in a number of comments to section 402A. Comment k explained that medical
devices and pharmaceuticals were not unreasonably dangerous if they
had a known, but unavoidable, risk. ' This comment was extended by
some courts to situations where the risk was unknown.' Comment i
made it clear that manufacturers were not subject to liability for harms
associated with "inherent characteristics" that could not be removed
from the product without compromising its desirability to the consumer;
specific mention was made of products as varied as sugar, tobacco, alcohol, and even castor oil, but the principle involved would apply to any
product that a court deemed to fit within the concept (e.g., a handgun).2
A policy judgment was made not to impose so-called "category liability." That was reserved for public policy decisions under administrative
and criminal law. If society believed that a product should not be made
because of its inherent characteristics, society should make its sale unlawful. Comment j made clear that the limitation of "unreasonably dangerous" created a fault-base in failure to warn and also did not require
manufacturers to warn about obvious dangers.27 Courts did not always
cite or utilize comments i, j, or k, but they were an integral part of the
work of section 402A.
Reporter Dean Wade wrote a seminal article that placed section
402A in its context at the time it was promulgated.8 The article showed
22. Id at 901.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 402A (1965).
24. See id. § 402A cmt. k.
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481-83 (Cal. 1988) (concluding that
for public policy reasons, comment k should not be limited to drugs that are "unavoidably unsafe"). For a discussion of the application of comment k, see Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably
Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment A, 42 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1139 (1985).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A cmt. i.
27. See id. § 402A cmt. j.
28. See John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551 (1980) (explaining the historical and most recent developments of section 402A at that
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that the Reporters' and advisory committee's focus was on products that
had been mismanufactured" Again, comment j dealt with warnings.
Other sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, specifically sections 39530 and 398, 31 addressed liability for the defective design of
products and utilized a rule based upon fault. Many courts were either
unaware of or ignored those sections and comment j as well as Dean
Wade's firsthand observations. These courts tried to apply the black
letter of section 402A in situations where products were said to be defective, either because of a manufacturer's failure to adequately warn or
because of the product's design.32
The courts grasped at non-negligence "formulas" to try to find and
impose strict liability in design and warning defect cases. Some suggested that a negligence formula could be used in a design case, but one
should impute knowledge of a risk to a manufacturer and then decide if
he was negligent.3 This "trick" formula imposed knowledge on a party
that the party did not have. Some courts took Restatement (Second)
section 402A to an even higher water mark of strict liability and rendered it absolute: they imposed liability in failure to warn cases, even if
a manufacturer neither knew nor could have known about a risk,' and in
design defects, even if there was no alternative way to make a product
given the technology that existed when the product was designed.35
time).
29. For example, a soda bottle that contained a mouse or other foreign element, makeup that
had particles of lead that scratched the person's face, or a bicycle that had a bolt left off, causing a
wheel to collapse. See id. at 554-55; see also Schwartz, supra note 25, at 1139 (discussing how
section 402A was intended to be applied to products not manufactured properly).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 395 (1965).
31. Id. § 398.
32. See Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Ct. App. 1968); Casetta v.
United States Rubber Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 645, 661 (Ct. App. 1968).
33. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 880-82 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc)
(referring to this process as the "hindsight" test); Stemhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1143-46
(Mont. 1997) (supporting the "imputation of knowledge doctrine"); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach.
Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) (in bane) ('The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be
negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved.").
34. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113-14 (La. 1986)
(noting that foreseeability is irrelevant); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 437-38
(Mo. 1984) (en bane) (noting that because actual knowledge is not necessary, the state-of-the-art
defense is not a viable option for manufacturers); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447
A.2d 539, 543-45 (N.J. 1982) (noting that foreseeability is irrelevant).
35. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 1984) (noting that for strict
liability purposes, a state-of-the-art defense is not relevant); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d
298, 305 (N.J. 1983) (noting that the state-of-the-art defense will not absolve a manufacturer from
liability if the risk-utility analysis is not satisfied); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
360 N.W.2d 2, 17 (Wis. 1984) ("A product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous even
though there are no alternative, safer designs available.").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:743

V. THE UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT BUILDS UPON
SECTION 402A

Some courts' arguable "misuse" of section 402A appeared to create
problems for interstate commerce. In 1976, President Ford established a
twelve-agency task force to study the problem; given the scope and importance of the project, the task force's work was authorized to continue
by President Carter.16 The Federal Interagency Task Force concluded
that uncertainties in products liability law had adverse effects on interstate commerce.37 Uncertainties stifled innovation, created unnecessary
insurance costs, and caused the withdrawal of good products from the
marketplace. The Department of Commerce, having been asked by
President Carter to develop solutions,39 addressed these uncertainties by
publishing the Model Uniform Product Liability Act40 ("UPLA").
The UPLA was offered by the Carter Administration as "model"
legislation that could be utilized by state legislatures. The UPLA built
upon what had been learned from a decade of the courts' "handling" of
section 402A. First, the UPLA made clear that there was to be one set of
product liability rules.4 The Restatement (Second) attempted to create
uniform rules, but some courts failed to understand or appreciate this.
Courts continued to allow alternative and vague theories of liability
predicated
on concepts derived from contract, such as implied war42
ranty.

Second, the UPLA appreciated that a "one black letter rule" approach to all aspects of products liability did not work. Products liability
was functional, not theoretical. For example, one specific rule was
needed for mismanufactured products, namely, the strict liability rule
that Deans Prosser and Wade had thought about when they drafted section 402A. Under this rule, liability would attach in cases concerning a
failure of quality control, where the product did not live up to the manu-

36. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrrY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; see also Walter Probert, The Politics of Torts
Casebooks: JurisprudenceReductus, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1238 n.39 (1991); Victor E. Schwartz
& Mark A. Behrens, The Road to FederalProduct Liability Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1363, 1365

(1996).
37. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at VII-243.

38. See id
39. See id. at VII-244.
40. See MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Dep't Commerce

1979).
41. See id § 101(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,716.
42. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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facturer's own design standards.43 Experience had shown that this rule
was predictable, insurable, and could be applied relatively easily by juries.
Additional rules were needed with respect to a manufacturer's duty
to design his product 44 and to provide adequate warnings about his product.45 Based upon a careful examination of a decade of case law, the
UPLA recognized that pure strict liability did not work in the areas of
design and failure to warn. Holding manufacturers to standards that
were impossible to fulfill produced adverse consequences that outweighed the benefits of such a rule. Liability in these instances was ultimately based on fault. 6 Although it was model legislation, the UPLA
became a source of law for courts."
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

The Reporter's Study and Two and One-HalfDecades of
Experience Under Section 402A Leads to the
Restatement (Third) of Torts

In 1990, the ALI's leadership appreciated that dynamic developments in products liability and tort law might call for further study. In
response, they established a Reporters' Study on Enterprise Liability for
Personal Injury." While the study was never adopted by the Institute as
"official policy," it laid an extensive research predicate to show that
there was a clear and present need to "restate" again at least parts of the
law of torts. Without question, one area was products liability.

43. See MODEL UNIF. PROD. LiAB. AcT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722 (analysis accompanying section 104).
44. See id. § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
45. See id. § 104(C).
46. See id., 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722 (analysis accompanying section 104).
47. See, e.g., Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576, 584-85 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (noting
that the UPLA was the basis for the Kansas products liability statute, and therefore the purposes of
the statutes were similar); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984)
(recognizing and approving distinctions among construction defects, design defects, and defects
based on failure to adequately warn, as set forth in the UPLA); Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell
Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 884 P.2d 920, 925-26 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (considering the analysis
set forth in the UPLA where the applicable state statute paralleled the UPLA).
48. See THE AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPoNSIILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY (1991).
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B. The Reporters:Experience Counted
A decision was made by the ALI's leadership to restate the law of
torts a third time. The initial focus was not on the entire multi-volume
Restatement (Second), but an area of law that had undergone the greatest change since the appearance of section 402A in 1965-products liability. Following a tradition that had its roots in 1923, the ALI leadership selected as Reporters the very best academia had to offer:
Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. of Comell Law School and Aaron
D. Twerski of Brooklyn Law School. The professors had both the practical and academic vitae that would make them a "good bet" to complete
the project and complete it well 9
The ALI recognized that the idea of vesting responsibility for
"restating" the law of products liability in people who had not published
or who had published articles that had a clear bent toward the plaintiff
or defendant was unacceptable. Reporters Twerski and Henderson had
written extensively in the products liability area." A review of all of
their written works indicates that neither scholar could be pigeonholed
as "pro-plaintiff' or "pro-defendant." The ALI also knew that there was
a need for persons with maturity and leadership abilities that would
command respect. Twerski and Henderson were the right people.
C. The Advisory Committee: Balance of InterestsRules
Following traditions set in the Restatement (First) and Restatement
(Second), an advisory committee was appointed to assist the Reporters.
Once again, the advisory committee was composed of judges, academics, and experienced practitioners.5' The ALI leadership appreciated that
49. James A. Henderson, Jr. is the Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law at Cornell University.
A.B. 1959, Princeton; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University. He is the co-author of JAMES
A. HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (3d ed. 1988); and JAMES A.
HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERsKi, PRODUCrS LIABILrrY: PROBLEMS AND PRocESs (2d ed.

1992).
Aaron D. Twerski is the Newell DeValpine Professor of Law at Brooldyn Law School. A.B.
1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute; J.D. 1965, Marquette University; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin. He is the author of AARON D. TWERSmi, CASES ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
(1972); and co-author of HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra.
50. See James A. Henderson, Jr., ProcessNorms in Products Litigation:Liabilityfor Allergic Reactions, 51 U. Plrr. L. REv. 761 (1990); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in
ProductsLiability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990); Aaron D.
Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of JudicialScreening
in ProductLiability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 861 (1983).
51. See RESTATEMENT gHSRD) OFTORTS: PRODS. LIAB. at v-vi (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
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times had changed from the publication of the Restatement (First) and
Restatement (Second). Products liability had become a topic of political
and social controversy. Strong academic background and knowledge of
the subject could not be the sole criteria for selection to the committee;
there also had to be a balance of interests.
It has been suggested in this Symposium and at the 1997 annual
meeting of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") that
the interests of plaintiffs were ignored. 2 These observations do not correspond with the facts. The interests of plaintiffs were fully and clearly
recognized. Paul Rheingold, one of the best known plaintiffs' attorneys
in the United States, who has pioneered the MER/29 litigation53 and currently is a leader in the so-called Fen-Phen litigation, was placed on the
committee. William Wagner, former president of ATLA and a practitioner who had shown both leadership in the Florida Bar and extraordinary
results in courtrooms, was placed on the committee. Robert Habush, a
successful practitioner and another former ATLA president, a major
leader of the Wisconsin State Bar, and a person well-versed and experienced in the "politics" of products liability law, was also a member.
Also included were professors who, during the course of their careers,
had shown a particular sensitivity to the plaintiffs' point of view, such
as Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern University School of
LawM Rounding out the committee were jurists who had for decades
shown a special sensitivity to those same interests.
The advisory committee also included three people who were perceived to have concerns about defense interests and experience. Sheila
Birnbaum, former Associate Dean of New York University and Senior
Partner in the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in
New York City; John Martin, General Counsel of Ford Motor Company; and myself.
Having participated in every single meeting of the advisory
committee from the beginning of the project in 1991 to the last one in
1996, I share with the reader that, without a doubt, if there were any
"tilt" on the advisory committee, it was clear that it was toward the in52. See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 761
(1998) (discussing the burdens placed on the plaintiff by the Restatement's reasonable alternative
design theory); Frank J. Vandall, The American Law Institute Is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 801 (1998) (suggesting that the ALI is "biased" against plaintiffs with respect to tobacco
and gun design suits).
53. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MERI29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968).
54. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of ProductsLiability: The ALI Restatement
Project,48 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1995).
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terests of the fine advocates Messrs. Rheingold, Habush, and Wagner.
Another point of equal importance, which might surprise the
reader, should be made clear. People on the advisory committee did not
always "argue" from the point of view that might appear to be in their
day-to-day professional interest. There were genuine, open-ended discussions where, from time-to-time, people were on the opposite side of
where they might usually be "pegged" by the public or those who knew
them. The process in the advisory committee meetings was one of mutual respect.
What did these meetings do and how did they proceed? At the first
meeting, the Reporters discussed concepts and ideas. They also put forward a draft.55 The draft was dissected into the smallest of sections and
discussed, debated, and revised.
The Reporters had, in a law review article, published their views of
what the new Restatement should look like. 6 Some members of
ATLA's leadership have criticized the Reporters for that endeavor and
suggested that the final work was "preordained" by the law review article. To the contrary, the draft provided a target for evaluation, criticism,
and revision. There was no "hidden" agenda.
D. The New Members of the ALl TeamMembers Consultative Group
In addition to the advisory committee, a new body, the Members
Consultative Group, was formed for the Restatement (Third) project and
other ALI projects. While the advisory committee was chosen by the
ALI leadership, any member of the ALI could join the Members Consultative Group, and many did. They included experienced practitioners
from all segments of the American Bar. The Members Consultative
Group had opportunities, time and again, to meet with the Reporters and
to criticize each portion of every draft.
E. CriticismBeyond the Advisory Committee and the
Members Consultative Group
The Reporters' "input" was not limited to the advisory committee
and the Members Consultative Group. They also met with leadership of
independent groups, such as ATLA, the Product Liability Advisory

55. See RESTATEMENT (IRaD) OFTORTs: PRODS. LIAB. (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993).
56. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992).
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Council, Inc.," and other interest groups, to make sure that no stone or

view was left unturned.5 8
F. The Council andALI Membership Review Process
After the Reporters, the advisory committee, the Members Consultative Group, and others had reviewed and revised each draft, including
Tentative Draft No. l," Tentative Draft No. 2,60 and a Proposed Final
Draft,6' that draft was reviewed in detail by the governing Council of the
ALl. The Council is the basic leadership group of the Institute, and only
persons of extraordinary background have the privilege to serve. The
Council's review process precludes any group or individual from fostering his or her agenda. Its goal is to fulfill the basic purpose of the ALI
itself-to assure that ALI work products are the best of professional excellence, fair, balanced, and learned.
After the Council has approved a draft, it is considered by the general membership of the ALI. The general membership considered and
evaluated drafts in 1993,62 1994,6 1995,64 1996, 6' and the Proposed Final
Draft in 199 7 .6.Days of debate and argument focused on each and every

section. After further revisions by the diverse ALI membership, a final
draft was approved by an overwhelming majority vote on May 17,
1997.67

57. The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. ("PLAC") is a nonprofit corporation with
128 corporate members from a broad cross-section of American industry. Its corporate members
include manufacturers and sellers in industries ranging from electronics to automobiles to pharmaceutical products. In addition, PLAC has approximately 300 sustaining members, who are leading
products liability defense attorneys from across the United States. PLAC was formed for the purpose of submitting amicus curiae briefs in important appellate cases involving significant public
policy issues affecting the law of products liability. PLAC was formed in 1983 and is based in
Reston, Virginia. PLAC briefs are highly regarded by courts and practitioners for their scholarship
and insight.
58. See Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 839, 841 (1997).
59. See RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
62. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1996).
OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
66. See RESTATErENT (IRD)
67. See RESTATaEMN (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. (1998).
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G. The Executive Director-AssuringFairness
With two Reporters, an advisory committee, a Members Consultative Group, the Council, and the ALI membership itself, there was an
essential need to have supervisory leadership placed in one individual.
That responsibility was vested in the Director of the ALI, Professor
Geoffrey Hazard. This was not the first controversial project Professor
Hazard had shepherded through the ALI process.
Professor Hazard presided over each meeting of the advisory
committee and Members Consultative Group. He helped assure that all
points of view were considered. When personalities or individual idiosyncrasies began to prevail over the exchange of ideas, Professor Hazard swiftly put the project back on course-reminding those present that
the goal of the project was to the search for fair resolutions. It helped
that Professor Hazard's background is in legal ethics and not tort law.
He came into the project without prior views on the subject. His focus
was an overall public policy perspective. When politics and "lobbying"
appeared to invade the process, Professor Hazard brought the project
back on course and focused the ALI on the end game of professional
excellence.
VIII. THE FINAL WORK-A MIDDLE GROUND
It is absolutely incorrect to characterize the Restatement (Third) as
a defense or plaintiff-oriented work product. The Restatement (Third)
followed the goal and purpose of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) and imposed strict liability on manufacturers for so-called
manufacturing defects.6 Following the overwhelming body of case law
for the past thirty years, as well as the UPLA, the Restatement (Third)
utilized fault-based liability for design and warning cases.'
Most of the criticism of the Restatement (Third) has come from a
few plaintiffs' lawyers and professors sympathetic to their point of
view. They have suggested that the Restatement (Third) is too defenseoriented. This assertion is surprising. There are so many modifications
and innovations made in the Restatement (Third) that are of assistance
to plaintiffs that one cannot list them all in an "overview" such as this
Article. In light of the unfounded criticism that the Restatement (Third)
is a vehicle for the defense bar, however, it might be helpful to list five.
First, the Restatement (Third) provides a new black letter rule im-

68. See id. §§ 1-2.
69. See id. § 2(b), (c).
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posing a continuing duty to warn on manufacturers. ° After a product is
in the marketplace with adequate warnings, a new liability exposure can
arise if the manufacturer does not act as a reasonable person with respect to a duty to warn about risks discovered after the product has been
in the marketplace. 7' The Reporters worked very hard to provide a rule
that had clarity and balance. But, a post-sale duty to warn, no matter
how carefully stated, is open-ended and uncertain in its application.
Also, only a minority of cases support such a duty.
Second, the Restatement (Third) imposes a new duty "to recall" a
product if a manufacturer voluntarily undertakes such a project. 73 In effect, the "good Samaritan rule," so criticized in the area of malpractice,
is imposed on manufacturers of products.74
Third, in a comment named after advisory committee member and
former ATLA President Robert Habush, the Restatement (Third) allows
a court, in extraordinary circumstances, to consider imposing liability
on a manufacturer for harms caused by a product that is so dangerous
that it should never have been made at all, even if there is no other way
to make the product.' In black letter, the Restatement (Third) would
allow the same type of claim with respect to pharmaceuticals that no
reasonable medical practitioner would prescribe 7 6 a result 77that major
courts believed was blocked under the Restatement (Second).
Fourth, the Restatement (Third) permits plaintiffs to win cases with
design, warnings, and mismanufacture claims under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, which basically states that you do not have to utilize direct
evidence to prove a defect and you do not need an expert.7' There is almost no case law in support of this view with respect to defects based
on either design or warnings.
Fifth, in what was a severe blow to the automobile industry, the
Reporters included a section in the "black letter" for cases involving socalled "secondary collisions," having as its practical effect that if a per70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(1998).
71. See id § 10(b).
72. See id. § 10(b) reporters' note.
73. See id. § 11(a)(2), (b).
74. See id. § 11 cmt. c.
75. See id. § 2 cmt. e.
76. See id. § 6(c).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); see also Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (interpreting comment k to include all prescription
drugs). The Brown court noted that it would be receptive to a "method [that] could be devised to
confine the benefit of the comment k negligence standard to those drugs that have proved useful to
mankind while denying the privilege to those that are clearly harmful." Id.
78. See RESTATEMNT (TIuRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
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son's injuries are deemed to be indivisible, the manufacturer can be held
liable for all of his injuries, including the injuries from the first collision, even though the manufacturer may have only slightly enhanced the
injuries in the second collision." The burden of proof for division is on
the manufacturer.' There is unfairness to this approach, because the
manufacturer can be held liable for a very serious harm that it did not, in
fact, cause. The strong and diligent advocacy efforts of those in the defense bar failed to persuade the Reporters.
In light of these facts, why have plaintiffs' lawyers claimed that the
Restatement (Third) is pro-defense? Their focus has been on two basic
policy choices. First, as has been indicated, the Restatement (Third) sets
forth one united set of rules for products liability.8 The plaintiffs' lawyers and some academics wanted a more open-ended liability system.
Nevertheless, the ALI membership strongly supported the one set of
rules. This approach is in accord with the rationale of most of the legal
literature, case law from the past three decades, as well as the UPLA.
The view that there should be one set of tort rules for products liability
was also the key predicate for the decision that began strict products liability in the first place: Justice Traynor's decision in Greenman. Justice
Traynor saw contract remedies infused in tort law as a "booby-trap for
the unwary."' ' Products liability works well if consumers know their
rights and manufacturers know their responsibilities, and the Restatement (Third) tries to fulfill that goal.
The plaintiffs' advocates also objected vehemently to the fact that
in a design defect case, the Restatement (Third) requires a plaintiff to
show that a reasonable alternative design could have provided overall
better safety than the original design. As has been indicated, through an
expanded use of res ipsa loquitur and the so-called "Habush Amendment," the Reporters eased this requirement.3 As a practical matter,
plaintiffs' lawyers in virtually every major products liability design
case, from allegedly defective automobiles to medical devices, have
shown the jury a reasonable alternative design.' They have helped the
jury visualize what was wrong with the product and how it could have
been made so as to have avoided causing the plaintiff harm. Winning

79. See id. § 16(d).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. § 16cmt. e.
See id. § 1.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (in bank).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAS. § 2 cmt.e (1998).
See I M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCS LIABI=Y § 6.12 (2d ed. 1988).
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plaintiffs' lawyers know that this is the only practical way to litigate a
design case.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article is not to suggest that Reporters Twerski
and Henderson were correct at every turn, but that the Reporters and the
ALI review process were fair, deliberative, and democratic. Any careful
analysis of the project, from beginning to end, shows this to be true. A
review of the ALI processes and procedures, from the inception of restatements of law in 1923 to the latest Restatement (Third) in 1998, indicates that such an approach was and always will be the hallmark of
The American Law Institute.
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